Standing Committee B

[Derek Conway in the Chair]

Identity Cards Bill

Clause 4 - Designation of documents for purposes of registration etc.

Patrick Mercer: I beg to move amendment No. 31, in page 4, line 26, at end add—
'(3) The Secretary of State must not make an order under this section unless a draft of the order has been laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.'.

Derek Conway: With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.

Patrick Mercer: I welcome you back to the Chair for yet another day of delight, Mr. Conway.
The amendment will, I hope, be a relatively simple matter to explain, and I have absolutely no doubt that the Minister will see the sense of what we are saying and will help us with the amendment, which I think is important. Clause 4 deals with the designation of documents for the purposes of registration and the like. The clause says that 
''The Secretary of State may by order designate a description of documents for the purposes of this Act.''
What are those documents? Does the provision mean that when one applies for a passport, one has to have an identity card? That would make eminently good sense as the Bill stands. But what other documents are we talking about? Would they include a driving licence, or a shotgun certificate? What documents will require us to register and to have access to an identity card? 
Let us take the idea of the shotgun certificate. A fee is required for such a certificate. Would we therefore be required, under the clause, to pay two fees—one for the shotgun certificate and one for the identity card? I should be grateful if the Minister would explain exactly where the provision starts and stops, and deal in detail with the 
''documents which a Minister of the Crown or Northern Ireland department is authorised or required to issue otherwise than by virtue of provision so made.''
To clarify, we are suggesting a simple amendment that would add a subsection (3) saying that the Secretary of State must not make an order unless a draft of it is laid before Parliament and is approved by both Houses. That strikes me as being eminently sensible. It will provide a check and will ensure that there is no mission creep—a ghastly phrase—in relation to identity cards. It will ensure that we know precisely how the cards are delineated and that we understand any financial implications of applying for other documents. It will also mean that, in every case, the Secretary of State will be required to explain, first  to the Commons and then to the Lords, exactly what each document means. 
Without the amendment, the number of documents designated may begin to proliferate. Each of the documents could mean the start of a Big Brother mentality. If that is not controlled by the Houses of Parliament, we could be allowing a degree of freedom that, in the wrong hands, may be abused and lead us into what most of us would agree are wholly undesirable areas. 
To that end, I earnestly suggest that the Minister considers the amendment, which provides a useful safety net in this part of the Bill. It is straightforward common sense that we should have some control over those Ministers or Secretaries of State who are involved in issuing cards and permitting other documents.

Derek Conway: Before I call the next speaker, I remind hon. Members that as the amendment is very broad, and as the clause is short, this may be treated as a stand part debate.

Richard Allan: I am grateful for that guidance, Mr. Conway.
We are very unhappy with the clause. The amendment that was tabled by the hon. Member for Newark (Patrick Mercer) would improve it to the extent that Parliament would get the opportunity through the affirmative resolution procedure to debate more fully the orders that the Secretary of State presumably intends to bring in. We are talking about a regular affirmative procedure rather than the super-affirmative procedure, which we were discussing the other day, so I am sure that the Minister could straightforwardly agree to the measure. 
The clause is difficult. The documents could be described as Trojan horse documents rather than as designated documents. They are a way of trying to introduce ID cards in a way that is sold to the public as being less painful and that disguises their true costs. The Government have come up with a cunning wheeze that means, ''We know that if we went out there today and said that everyone must get ID cards, that would be a problem, so we will designate classes of documents.'' They originally talked about passports and driving licences and now they seem to be saying that passports only will be involved. It would be helpful if the Minister clarified that. 
The Government seem to be saying, ''If we designate these documents and say that everyone who applies for them must get an ID card, somehow it will have gone so far through the population that when we come along with a big stick later on and say that everyone must have them it will be a less painful exercise.'' That opens up a lot of scope for fudge, particularly over the costings. The Government have said that the cost of a biometric passport and ID card package is £85. They will designate the document and say to all of us, ''You have to pay £85 if you want a new passport, part of the cost being for the ID card.'' My fear is that there will be no clarity over which is which. Until ID cards are compulsory, I do not see why I should not have the option to say, ''No, I will just take the biometric passport.'' I accept that if I  come along later and have to get the ID card separately, because the scheme has been brought in on a compulsory basis, that will cost more than if those documents had been issued together, but I do not see why I, as the citizen, should not have that choice. 
 The designated documents route is a sneaky way of trying to make compulsory what is being described as voluntary. The scheme is neither fish nor fowl, neither voluntary nor compulsory with the clause included. If the clause is to be included and the legislation passed, it would be far more appropriate not to designate any documents and to accept that the Passport and Records Agency could offer the ID card as an option to people who are applying for a passport. It could be a genuinely voluntary scheme with the warning that if people come along later and want to get an ID card separately, it may cost them more than having got the package together. Let us leave the package as a voluntary option and not fudge things. 
As we have said throughout, from a good governance and good order point of view there are some huge dangers of cost creep—if not mission creep. The Minister has said with a slightly nervous smile that the scheme is the largest of its kind ever to be attempted. We believe that it will prove to be extremely challenging. The people who did the assessment of the technology for the Government said that the use of three biometrics is potentially hugely expensive and, again, has not been trialled anywhere. 
We think that the costs will grow out of all proportion. It will not lead to a good governance situation if they then get wrapped up and disguised in Passport and Records Agency costs. It would be far better to keep matters separate. In a sense, the designated documents route is a way of conning the public into accepting something that they might not accept if it were presented as a separate package. 
 I caution against allowing the clause to stand part of the Bill, but if that is to happen, I hope that the slight improvement that has been offered by the hon. Gentleman will be agreed to. When we discuss whether or not to designate a passport, I hope we will have the opportunity to do that through the affirmative rather than the negative resolution procedure. I support the amendment.

Humfrey Malins: It is as well to understand exactly what the clause says and what we are expected to approve this morning. It quite plainly says that the Secretary of State can by order—that is not parliamentary scrutiny—designate a document. Anyone who applies for such a document has to apply for an ID card at the same time. The restriction in the clause is that the document that the Secretary of State can designate has to be one that
''a person has a power or duty to issue by virtue of provision made by or under an enactment''.
Those are interesting words. 
The amendment, which we feel strongly about, has two purposes. First, it aims to ensure that Parliament has an opportunity to consider the Home Secretary's proposals by way of designation. Secondly, it aims to  tease from the Government exactly what documents they not only have in mind, but may have in mind as time goes by. 
That brings me to the first essential question. Does the Minister have any idea exactly how many documents there are in our society that fall within the description of 
''a document that a person has a power or duty to issue by virtue of a provision made by or under an enactment''?
I am sure that the list of such documents is endless. We obviously have the passport, which we understand about, but the references made so far to function creep are very relevant under this clause. What about the driving licence? Can the Minister say something about that as well? But there are many other documents, which, in my judgment, are issued by an authority pursuant to an enactment, and which could, strictly speaking, come within the ambit of this clause. For example, what about a birth or marriage certificate? 
I assume, by the way, that we are talking about copy documents as well as original documents. There is no reference here whatever to the documents being limited to original documents. The clause relates simply to anyone applying for a document, which brings me on to my next point. Under this clause, the person may be applying for such a document on behalf of someone else.

Richard Allan: The hon. Gentleman explains the case well and brings my mind to national insurance number cards, which are issued to all 16-year-olds. The Bill as it is leaves a gaping hole, whereby ID cards could effectively be made compulsory under this clause simply by making the NI number card a designated document, which would be issued to 16-year-olds, the people to whom the Government intend to issue ID cards.

Humfrey Malins: The hon. Gentleman makes a good point. We must pause to refer to the explanatory notes, which plainly say:
''If a document is designated, anyone applying for one.''
There is no reference anywhere to applying for a passport in one's own name, which brings me to a few questions. I assume that a death certificate is, for example, 
''a document that a person has a power or duty to issue by virtue of a provision made by or under an enactment.''
It plainly is such a document, and so is a copy of a death certificate. The purpose of the Committee is to put forward perhaps extreme examples and ask the Minister whether they could be covered by this clause or not. If they are not to be covered, where does it say that they are not covered? If, for example, I apply for a copy of a death certificate as a lawyer, on behalf of a deceased client, I am an individual applying for a document. Is it impossible for the death certificate or copy to be designated? I might be applying for such as an individual executor or a family member. I might not have a card. Could I be trapped by this clause? 
Clearly only official-type documents will be designated—documents 
''that a person has a power or duty to issue.''
Let us look at one or two other areas to reinforce the same point. There are a number of official documents that have to be issued by a court upon request or it has a power to issue them if it so chooses. I will not go through them in detail, but I suggest that documents such as county court judgments, or charge sheets issued by the police upon application by the defendant or by his lawyer, could fall within the clause. The list could be endless. 
The purpose of our amendment is twofold. First, could the Minister be explicit on the issue of the volume and scope of documents that might be designated? Would they include or could they include officially certified copies of such documents? Could anyone applying—not for his or her own benefit but in the course of a professional duty—be caught under this wording? The Minister has much to say about that. 
The second and perhaps more important purpose is because of the very wide-ranging nature of the clause itself. Will proper parliamentary scrutiny in both Houses be required before any designation takes place?

Kate Hoey: Having discovered that I was on this Committee rather late, I have not been able to attend all its sittings so far, and I apologise for that. Being opposed in principle to identity cards, I find the Committee quite difficult anyway. It is just tinkering—making slight amendments that in no way change the fundamental issue. I have yet to be convinced of the need for identity cards, though admittedly I have not been here all the time.
However, I support the amendment. If we are going to go down this road, the more parliamentary scrutiny the better. The Minister said that people who were against identity cards made sweeping statements, yet we have heard a lot of sweeping statements from those in favour of them. The issue is about making sure that, as a country, we harmonise more with the rest of Europe, so that in the long term we can find different ways of integrating our justice systems. I do not want to go down that road, but, where we have the opportunity to do so, we must ensure that Parliament has a detailed look at any aspect that goes further in making citizens, or subjects, of this country end up in the longer term with a compulsory document. That is why I support the amendment.

David Curry: This is the first time I have served on a Home Office Bill, so I apologise if I am not immediately familiar with the culture of such occasions. I am a simple journalist, not a lawyer. I always thought that an advantage, but I realise that view may not be in vogue.
I want clarification, having thought about the documents in my wallet. I have my passport, my international driving licence, a vaccination certificate to go with my passport, my senior citizen's rail pass, a bus pass issued by the Harrogate and district bus service and my freedom pass, which I have just  acquired. I am proud to have achieved the age to receive that. I had thought the age had no advantages but now discover it is financially advantageous. In future, how many of those documents could be issued to me without registration for an identity card? 
Secondly, what will happen if I am resident abroad and need to renew or obtain a passport—for example, if I were resident in Mogadishu or Ulan Bator and the passport was for a child? Both countries have British embassies, if the Government have not closed them down yet. If I must also go through a procedure to get an identity card or register, how long will it take? What will the procedures be at a remote British overseas post that can issue passports to fulfil also the requirements for registration? Will there be an interminable delay?

Des Browne: I rise to make my point now, lest I forget it when I respond to this short debate. I can reassure the right hon. Gentleman and all Committee members that although it is the Government's intention to designate passports, it will not be all passports. For example, the measure will not apply to passports for children under 16, nor to passports issued abroad.

David Curry: That is an important point, which I was about to raise. One of my granddaughters was born on 16 June. She went to France at the beginning of July and was required to have a passport and a passport photo. I never figured out the purpose of the rather incoherent blob on the page, nor what sort of identification it provided. I am glad that she did not also have to apply for her documents at that stage, as remembering where she lived might have provided some difficulty—even for somebody as outstandingly clever and well endowed with a good genetic inheritance as she.

Derek Conway: On the subject of genetic inheritance, I call Mr. Clifton-Brown.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: I do not know what that is supposed to mean, Mr. Conway, but there we are. I am sure it has the right, rather than the wrong, connotations.
I make one brief point to the Minister. Citizens are supposed to know—although how I am not entirely sure—about far too many enactments of bits of legislation. The other day, I came across an example involving the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000 that someone was supposed to know about just because information about their land was posted on the internet. To my mind, that is not adequate notification by Departments that somebody is subject to particular legislation. My point to the Minister is very simple: it is very important that this proposal be debated in Parliament, so that whenever there is a change it is given publicity and citizens know about it. How could they otherwise?

Des Browne: You invited Committee members to treat this as a clause stand part debate, Mr. Conway, and encouraged them to be wide-ranging in their comments. The hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam (Mr. Allan) took you at your word and appears to have moved us on to debating his amendments to  clause 5. I could deal with clause 5 in more depth in the context of whether being put on the register ought to be optional, which is one point he made. However, he has tabled a specific amendment to clause 5 to deal with that issue.
My hon. Friend the Member for Vauxhall (Kate Hoey) also took you at your word, Mr. Conway, and made very general comments. Interestingly, in her preamble she referred to the number of general statements made on both sides of the argument; she then made the most generalised criticism of ID cards that I have heard. She is to be congratulated on taking us into another realm. Nothing could be further from my mind, or those of other Ministers with whom I have spoken, than bringing us into line with the rest of the European Union in this context. That has not been my thinking, nor would I deploy such an argument. I would be proud to deploy it if it were part of my thinking—I would be happy to debate it with her and would not run away from it—but it is not. 
Let me make some general observations on the clause so that Committee members get a clearer understanding of the Government's approach to the issue. Clause 4 will provide a mechanism for individuals to apply for an ID card when they apply for a designated document. That will be compulsory, and we shall deal with that issue in more depth. Since I became responsible for this area of public policy, I have been clear in my public statements and during debates that the ID card scheme is compulsory. 
The first criticisms that I came across were that we would need primary legislation for an ID card scheme, that the mechanism for moving to full compulsion was inappropriate and that there would be no debate in the context of primary legislation about compulsion. My response was that there would be such a debate during discussions on the Bill. If we did not have that debate during those discussions, we would not have had it at the appropriate time. Nobody should vote for the ID card scheme unless they understand that it is compulsory. Let us put the debate out in the open and discuss the matter to make it easier for hon. Members to understand why it is progressing in such a way. 
It is logical and sensible to progress in such a fashion because of the scale of the challenge to put the compulsory ID scheme into operation. That should be done incrementally and at a point at which the operation of the scheme has the confidence of the public so that we can return to Parliament and move to full compulsion. Let us be under no illusion that the Government intend to bring in a compulsory ID scheme; there is no stealth, no dishonesty and no masking of such a proposal.

John Taylor: I am grateful to the Minister for giving way because he was in the middle of developing his argument. Before he completely passes on from his response to the hon. Member for Vauxhall, I want him to reassure the Committee now that the exercise has nothing to do with European convergence, that it is not minded in that way and that it is not set in that form. If the Bill has merit—on which my jury is still out, by the way—it is the proper supervision of the sovereignty of the  nation and its good and efficient governance. If it brings good order to my country, I shall continue to take an interest in it. If it is part of European convergence, I may go a different way.

Derek Conway: Before the Minister replies, the remarks of the hon. Member for Vauxhall in the European context were made almost as a throwaway rather than a long-standing contribution to the debate, so I urge Members not to be tempted down the road of European convergence, which is not specific to this measure. This is a point that the Minister will want to deal with at some stage, but I would rather that he did not do so while we are debating the clause.

Des Browne: Thank you, Mr. Conway, for your helpful advice. I wish to respond to the intervention by saying that the hon. Gentleman can have the reassurance he seeks.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: The Minister said, significantly, that it is the Government's intention to make identity cards compulsory. Is it also their intention to make it compulsory to carry identity cards?

Des Browne: As the hon. Gentleman should know, there is a measure that provides for the opposite by saying that it cannot be made compulsory to carry the cards. It has never been the Government's intention to make that compulsory. The hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam explained to some degree why that is not necessary and why we do not need to go down that route, with all the civil liberty implications of the compulsion to carry. In any event, people carry their biometrics. If people are in such a position that the police or the authorities are entitled under other legislation to establish their identity, they will have their biometrics with them and the register will allow their proper identification, if necessary.

Humfrey Malins: Following on from that last point, the Minister has been frank in saying that the scheme will be compulsory. Does he not recognise the sheer logic of saying that if it is compulsory to have a card it must follow, as night follows day, that it should be compulsory to carry it and to produce it on request, or the compulsion in having a card will be utterly watered down?

Des Browne: With respect to the hon. Gentleman, I fundamentally disagree. For the scheme to be effective, it is unnecessary to require people to carry the cards or, worse, to have to produce them on request. That would be an invasion of civil liberties and is the way to create an environment in which all the worst excesses that people attribute to the scheme, which it is deliberately designed to preclude, could creep into the society in which we live. It is unnecessary.
As I constantly repeat in these debates, if we must have a discussion on the powers that the police should have, it should be held in the context of police powers, not in the context of an ID card scheme that is designed to provide a method of giving a gold standard of identification to individuals, protecting their identity and protecting us in relation to the purposes set out in the Bill.

David Curry: That refers to production on request, but the Minister said earlier that part of the purpose of  registration is to ensure that people do not seek employment if they are not entitled to be employed. Presumably, therefore, a would-be employer is entitled to ask for evidence that somebody is employable, which will be carried on the identity card or will be registered. Equally, there is a long clause about the delivery of public services. Presumably, somebody who is delivering public services is entitled to ask whether there is proof of entitlement to them.
If I am stopped by the police and they ask to see my driving licence, I think I am right in saying that I can produce it at a police station of my choice within two weeks.

Derek Conway: Order. I do not like to be a restrictive Chairman, but we are going far from the nature and definition of the clause. Perhaps hon. Members will have this discussion when we get to clause 8, and I am sure it will be in order to do so. However, we are pre-empting later debates that the Committee will want to explore.
I realise that these are important matters—I do not deny that—but they do not relate specifically to the clause, so I must insist that the Committee return to the concept of the clause. The compulsion aspects will be relevant when we get to clause 8 or another part of the Bill.

David Curry: Thank you, Mr. Conway. That is most helpful.
My question is this: if people do not have to carry a document, do they have to give an assurance that they possess it? If they possess it, can they say, ''I invite someone to call next Thursday at 3.30 pm and I will show it''? That sounds absurd, but we are in a curious Catch-22 situation in which people might be required to have a document, but are not required to demonstrate that they have it, even though certain services can be obtained only if they have it. I am confused.

Des Browne: The purpose of this Committee is to try to reduce confusion and give explanations on behalf of the Government, which is my job as a Minister. I am happy to do that to the extent that I am able. I will endeavour to assist Committee members within the confines of the relevance of the debate. I shall quickly reply to the right hon. Gentleman's helpful remarks, as that will allow me to reiterate something that I have said in public on a number of occasions. Then I shall deal with the amendment and make some comments on the clause.
The current position is that in all the activities that the right hon. Gentleman identified, those people who provide the activities, or opportunities for employment, are required to establish the identity of the person to whom they are provided. Indeed, one Government—I think he was a Minister at the time—enacted legislation requiring employers to do just what he suggests employers will be required to under the Bill. That Government willed the way by saying that employers had to establish who people were and whether they were entitled to work, because there was  concern about illegal working, but they did not give employers the means to do that. 
The scheme will give us—due to technological developments and the coincidence of the fact that we will be collecting biometrics in relation to a substantial proportion of the population for international travel documents and passports—the opportunity to make that step towards a system for proving people's identity to a proper, secure standard. For the first time ever, there will be a gold-plated means for people to prove who they are in all relevant circumstances. 
The scheme will create that opportunity and then create opportunities for those who provide public services appropriately to designate through regulation the incremental use of that scheme and of the cards in other areas. That does not seem to be so difficult. In fact, we operate on the basis that we are not giving the police extra powers, subject to one or two minor qualifications that we discussed when we last debated these issues. We are not creating extra powers for anybody; we are just creating additional opportunities. However, this scheme will regulate the exercise of existing powers through regulation. We will address that matter later.

David Curry: Will a penalty be entailed in terms of not being able to access a service if I choose not to demonstrate the existence of an identity card or similar document?

Des Browne: That will be a matter for consideration in the context of any future regulations that might be made on the use of cards for proof of identity in order to access services, rather than in this context.
Clause 4 is the key to the delivery of the ID card scheme because it provides a mechanism by which individuals can be brought into the scheme. An application for a designated document will, in effect, trigger an application for an ID card. The issuing procedures are set out in detail in clause 8, but the designation of a document must precede any of the procedures where the ID card is issued together with, or as part of, a designated document. A stand-alone card could be issued by the Secretary of State under clause 8 without any documents being designated. 
The hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam suggests that the advantage of proceeding in this way is that it provides a stealthy means of compulsion. That is not the case; I am absolutely open about the position in relation to compulsion. The advantage is that there are already established processes with high levels of security for issuing certain designated documents such as passports and residence permits, and those processes will form the basis of the work of the ID cards delivery agency; for passports, there will shortly be the collection of biometrics in any case. Roll-out will be incremental as people come to apply for, or renew, documents—or, in the case of foreign nationals, arrive to stay in the UK for more than three months. In that way, the problems associated with a ''big bang'' approach can be minimised. We can do a number of things. We can incrementally build the register and the database, and the confidence of the people of the UK in the system, before finally moving  to full compulsion by a process that we will debate in due course.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: The Minister said something very important when he referred to anyone who is in the UK for over three months. Does that apply to people from all European Union countries, including southern Ireland?

Des Browne: It applies to everyone who is resident in the UK.

Richard Allan: I thought that we established in earlier debates that people who are covered by the common travel area scheme because they are from the Republic of Ireland would not need an identity card if they were frequent visitors to the UK. If they then decide to stay in the UK for an extended period, will there be a trigger of some kind after three months which means that they suddenly have to get one?

Des Browne: With respect, the hon. Gentleman indicated that he did not think that I was giving the right answer to the question that had been asked, then he intervened and asked a different question.
There is a difference with regard to people who move regularly within the common travel area; we have an agreed relationship with Irish citizens. On Second Reading, a contribution was made that identified that. This scheme applies to everybody who is resident in the UK for three months or more. It is as simple as that; there are no qualifications. The hon. Gentleman implied that he understood that, but then he asked about other people. 
On clause 4, it is important to bear in mind that the Bill does not designate any documents. It gives the power to designate documents by order. In the way in which the Bill is currently framed that is a process that Parliament will be involved in, although it will be done by the negative resolution procedure. I know that the hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Malins) thinks that that is no parliamentary scrutiny at all. It is parliamentary scrutiny; it is just not parliamentary scrutiny to the standard that he wants. 
It is important to note that the only documents that can be designated are those that are issued with statutory authority, or those 
''which a Minister of the Crown or Northern Ireland department is authorised or required to issue''.
The hon. Gentlemen who contributed to the debate—and my hon. Friend the Member for Vauxhall by implication, although she did not say this—rightly pointed out that that covers a very wide range of documents. 
The clause is drafted in that way to make the distinction between documents issued by private organisations and those issued by governmental organisations. The Government have always made it clear that we intend to designate British passports issued to people who are aged 16 or over and resident in the UK and residence permits issued to foreign nationals. We also considered designating driving licences issued by the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency in Great Britain and driving licences issued in Northern Ireland. However, for reasons to do with the regulations, and particularly the EU regulations, that  relate to the nature of those documents, we concluded that it would not be appropriate at this stage to designate them, although we will keep open that possibility, and look at how the documents develop. 
We have no plans to designate other official documents such as the national insurance number card, although the clause as it is currently framed makes that possible. Although the hon. Member for Woking was to a degree caricaturing the situation with regard to that power, the way in which the clause is drafted would allow the designation of a significant number of documents, including some of those that he mentioned. However, there is no intention to designate any of them.

Kate Hoey: May I probe the Minister slightly further on the Republic of Ireland question, as I do not know whether it would be more appropriate to do so in the context of any other part of the Bill? Will we have two classes of people? Will Irish citizens living in Northern Ireland and the UK be fine? As the Minister knows, there is a problem with regard to Irish citizens' special relationship with the UK. How will things work in practice for people who live one side of the border and move around on the other side, or for people who live in Northern Ireland with an Irish passport?

Des Browne: I cannot make it any clearer than I have done; if a person is resident in the UK for three months or more, they will be required to register under this scheme. That is how the scheme works, so let us put this matter to bed.
On Second Reading, it was noted that people could live on the other side of the border between Ireland and Northern Ireland and travel backward and forward. That was described as a loophole, and I understand why it might be thought to be a cause of concern given the recent history of Northern Ireland. It is the case that some people travel back and forth across that border; people live their lives in that way in all border areas. However, there is a special relationship between us and Ireland. We describe this part of the world as a common travel area and we allow people to travel freely within it; we have allowed that for a long time. This scheme does not affect the position of Irish citizens in any way. If there are concerns about this matter, they must be dealt with not now, but in another context.

David Curry: The Minister has dealt with the Irish citizens question. Can he give an assurance that the legislation will be applied in an identical way north and south of the border between England and Scotland, or might different circumstances and conditions apply to people living in Scotland under the devolved Administration? In the Queen's Speech debate, in a reply to the leader of the Scottish National party, the Prime Minister suggested that the legislation was capable of different applications.

Derek Conway: Order. The Minister may be tempted to reply to that, but I will not let him do so because we are miles away from the clause. We will talk about the documents mentioned in the clause, not the geographical scope of the scheme, which is not covered in what we are discussing.

Des Browne: Thank you, Mr. Conway. I am sure that there will be an opportunity for us to deal with the other issue shortly.
The designation order anticipated in clause 4 would specify exactly which documents were covered. The order would be limited to tying in those documents with the entitlement to registration for those over 16 who have been resident in the UK for the prescribed period. It is obvious that the provision is not intended to designate any documents other than those to which I referred. However, having listened to the debate and considered the matter in anticipation of this discussion, I have come to the view that there is some merit in the argument behind the amendment. 
Unfortunately, I am not in a position to concede the amendment at this stage, but there is some merit in Opposition Members' argument that we are discussing an event of such importance that it should be considered by Parliament, albeit in the context of the Bill. The affirmative procedure would allow discussion and explanation. It would give the public the opportunity to be aware that such an important step was being taken, and let them know that there would be appropriate parliamentary scrutiny. I undertake to think about that.

Humfrey Malins: I am most grateful; what the Minister says is terribly helpful. I think that he implied earlier that he was not entirely happy with the drafting of the clause, in terms of the scope of documents and the use of the word ''anyone'' in the explanatory notes. Can he undertake to look into that, to see whether any improvement can be made before Report?

Des Browne: With respect to the hon. Gentleman, I did not make that point—or if I did, I made it accidentally. I will have to go back and look at exactly what I said. However, of course there will be an opportunity for me to look at the clause, as I will in any case be considering the amendment.
I must say, I am minded to concede the amendment, and if I am still of that view when we come to the remaining stages of the Bill, I will bring forward a Government amendment to the same effect, or, outwith the context of the Committee, I will continue to consult on the issue and discuss how we ought to do what is proposed under the amendment. I will, as the hon. Gentleman suggests, consider how the rest of the clause is drafted, but I am comfortable with it, and it does not seem to generate any other serious concerns. It creates an opportunity, and I think that we ought to have the appropriate parliamentary scrutiny of the exercise of that opportunity. 
I invite the hon. Member for Newark to withdraw the amendment on the clear understanding that I am sympathetic to his points and will come back to the issue in the remaining stages of the Bill.

Patrick Mercer: I am grateful to the Minister. In my opening remarks I said that I had no doubt that he would be persuaded by the strength of our arguments, and it would seem from his comments that he was.
We have had a wide-ranging and extremely useful discussion that has put down some markers for discussion later in Committee. I am particularly  grateful to the Minister for spelling out that the scheme is compulsory. He is not trying to mask the fact that it will, in due course, be compulsory throughout the country, and that it is being introduced incrementally—and that, if one approves of the scheme, seems thoroughly sensible. 
However, there is something that I still do not understand. For 26 years, I carried an identity card issued to me by the Government. I was compelled to carry it, and had to produce it on request. I do not understand the point of saying to someone, ''Here is the card, but you do not need to carry it,'' but I am sure that we will return to that later.

Des Browne: The hon. Gentleman refers, if I understand his personal history, to the fact that for 26 years he was a serving soldier, and there was a requirement to carry at all times an identity document that proved that he was a serving soldier. That was proof of his status and position in society, not of his identity; it was an Army identity card, not proof of his identity. It is just the same as a policeman being required to carry his warrant. ID cards are a different situation.

Patrick Mercer: I take that point. I am sure that we will return to discuss the matter at a later stage. The logic still defeats me, but I am sure that the Minister will be able to illuminate me at that later stage. As a result of the discussions about the common travel area and, in particular the interventions by the hon. Members for Vauxhall and for Sheffield, Hallam, I think we have had a taste of what will come up in the future.

John Taylor: I think my hon. Friend was nearly at the end of his remarks, but will he join me in noting that the Minister graciously anticipated a Government amendment on the remaining stages to meet his amendment? I would like it to be on record that it will be a Government amendment. That is crucial because, as we all know, an Opposition amendment could well get stifled by the guillotine that will operate on the remaining stages. Will he reassure himself that the Minister will table a Government amendment to meet his requirement?

Patrick Mercer: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his intervention, which as usual sheds light and clarity on the situation. The remarks that I was about to make were exactly that the Minister has generously and graciously said that he will table a Government amendment to make the clause that much clearer. In the light of that, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Derek Conway: Before I put the question on the clause, I realise that it has been a fairly frustrating debate for some Committee members. However, when we get to clauses 6 and 8 there will be an opportunity to raise their concerns.
Clause 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 5 - Applications relating to entries in Register

Richard Allan: I beg to move amendment No. 164, in clause 5, page 4, line 35, leave out 'must' and insert
'may, if the applicant so chooses,'. 
The Minister was correct to say that the debate on the previous clause was a preface to this debate. In clause 5, we explore the mechanism for how the designated document procedure will work. The amendment seeks to break the link between the designated document and the ID card as a form of compulsion. It says that the only circumstances under which an ID card would be issued, or someone would be entered on the register when applying for the designated document, would be if the applicant chose it. It reverses the presumption, so that the applicant has to request the ID card rather than the Government being able to insist that they take it. I am grateful to the Minister for the clarity of his remarks on the previous clause about compulsion. 
It seems to us, however, that the field of play has shifted as we have gone through the ID cards debate, and it has sometimes been difficult to keep up with where we are. My fear is that the legislation still reflects a previous stage of the political debate. The Minister has just accepted that the designated document procedure will now be subject to slightly more robust parliamentary procedure. As originally drafted, it was very weak in terms of scrutiny. All the scrutiny is piled up in clause 6, where we have the super-affirmative, gold-plated procedure. However, we understand from the last debate that the provision in clause 6, which deals with requiring the last 20 per cent. to get ID cards, is not the important one. By the time we get to that debate, we will have discussed compulsion. We are doing compulsion now—on this amendment and these clauses—and we will not be doing compulsion in the sense of clause 6. The decision, in principle, is being taken now.

Des Browne: I rise to reinforce the point that I have consistently made in this debate. We should have the debate about compulsion in the context of this legislation. We had it on Second Reading, and that was the appropriate place to have it. We should have it here in Committee when it arises, and not in relation to one clause or another but across the aboard. We should have the debate about compulsion now. People who do not agree with compulsion do not vote for this Bill.

Richard Allan: I am grateful to the Minister for being so forthright. Because of earlier debates about how the ID card would work, there was a perception that we could introduce a voluntary scheme now. That was the situation that I have been trying to describe. The Government's intention was to introduce a voluntary scheme, and then to have a later decision, perhaps five years down the track or in 2008, when they would come back to the House and have a super-affirmative procedure to decide on compulsion. I suggest that the structure of the Bill still reflects that situation, although the Minister has now made it absolutely clear that the politics is not as such. The impact of  accepting the Bill is to accept compulsory ID cards today.
I have been trying to describe the situation that I saw in the legislation. Certainly a reason for tabling this amendment is to reverse that position to an earlier stage in the political debate, when the suggestion was of genuine voluntarism. I will set out the reasons why the amendment seeks to do that.

Kate Hoey: I support the hon. Gentleman's amendment, but does he not agree that it would have been much more transparent and honest if the Government had called this Bill the compulsory identity card Bill?

Richard Allan: The hon. Lady is correct. There is still confusion among the public. The terms of the Bill are such that there is a sense of voluntarism, which is only partial.
There is another debate at the moment, about the digital switch-over of TVs, which will find echoes here. At some point, the analogue TV signal will be switched off, which may be far more resented by people than anything to do with ID cards. That will be a more contentious decision. The Government have set up a genuinely voluntary procedure, in which they are saying, ''Please go out and buy digital TV equipment. At some point we will switch the analogue signal off.'' Some of the features are parallel. The decision is about numbers at any particular stage. How many people have digital TV? How big is the rump that we have to deal with with the big stick? How upset are people going to get when we deal with them? How much will things cost? 
In these clauses, we are talking about the principle of compulsion, as set out by the Minister. When we get to clause 6—to the implementation of the regulations required some years hence, in 2008 or whenever—the debate is going to be about cost rather than any issue of principle. Who picks up the tab for the last 20 per cent.? I accept that we are now going to move on. However, the extraordinary thing is that we started out with a super-affirmative procedure for something that is, in a sense, quite trivial—a debate about the costs of dealing with this last 20 per cent.—and a very understated procedure for the big debate, which is the imposition of the ID card on the 80 per cent. It seems back to front to do it in that way. 
If we are going to have this compulsory scheme, there are still some important questions about costs. Is there going to be a clear separation of costs in the Passport and Records Agency between those associated with the ID cards and those associated with passport? That is important for scrutiny purposes. The Minister may say that it is value for money to wrap all this up together, but we wish to establish the difference between our proposed scheme in which the ID card is a voluntary bolt-on to the passport, and the Minister's scheme in which everything is wrapped up together. 
Unless we break the costs out and see those associated with ID cards, we will not be able to judge the success or failure of the Government's ID card scheme. My fear is that that is precisely the Government's intention—that all should be fudged  and put together. From a parliamentary point of view, on a debate this contentious, it is important that we are able to see that. I hope the Minister can assure us that the true costs of the two things—passports and ID cards—will be presented separately.

John Taylor: Not very long ago the hon. Gentleman referred to—I use his expression, as it is not one that I would have coined—the ''rump'', the sans culottes, those who have not signed up. Is not part of the difficulty with the rump that we will not know who they are?

Richard Allan: I think the sans culottes were those at the barricades.

John Taylor: They probably will be.

Richard Allan: Yes. We will know who those people are, because, as we established in an earlier debate, the Government will have a huge amount of data on them in other databases. Their only defining feature, in my understanding, is that they are people who do not have passports. Again, that is where the cost issues may come into it. It is more likely that elderly people and those on lower incomes will not have passports or will have not applied for them. Therefore, they will be subject to the clause 6 compulsion. I am sure that we will debate that in detail later.
It is important that the separation of costs is clearly set out and that we know whether there is cross-subsidy in the passport system between the passport applications and the ID card system. We may end up with a situation in which those who apply for passports today and over the next few years will subsidise the free or discounted ID cards for those who are brought in under clause 6. That might be a proper policy for the Government to set out, but they need to be explicit. I fear that there is, again, a complete lack of transparency. 
It would be helpful to know whether there will be full cost recovery. The Government's regulatory impact assessment says that all the money for setting up the scheme will be recovered from people who are applying. The clause and the Government's procedures clearly define a set of people who will pay for the setting up of the scheme: those who are applying for passports now. We must be clear whether all the costs will be recovered. 
I want to advance the case for the amendment both specifically and in terms of saying that there should be a voluntary extension. This debate has given rise to a question: why have the Government not advanced a policy that says that getting the 80 per cent. of people who will have biometric passports on to the system correctly should be the priority? The passport database and those documents that have a defined specific purpose—making it possible for a citizen to travel—would be available to the law enforcement agencies for their purposes under all the normal procedures and with all the normal safeguards. Therefore, why has the focus not been on getting biometric passports sorted out? It should be recognised that that would cover 80 per cent. of the population? Perhaps there could be a voluntary ID  card scheme for people who do not want to have a passport and who want the convenience of an ID card. However, we should not go to all the hassle, expense and fuss of coming up with this all-encompassing, all-singing, all-dancing scheme. 
 We should allow the Passport and Records Agency to do its work issuing passports to citizens. We should get that sorted out and deal with the challenges that it will have to face, which are big enough on getting biometric passports right. Should that not be a higher priority? Our amendment would allow it get the passports right while accepting that the only people who would go on to the ID card system are those who choose to do so voluntarily. Going for the solution that the Government have set out is overkill.

Chris Mole: If the hon. Gentleman is sincere in his protestations that we should disaggregate the costs of the introduction of the biometric passport from the other aspects of the ID card system, can we rely on him and his hon. Friends on Third Reading and in the public presentation of the debate on this matter not to present the overall costs of the introduction of biometric passports as part of the costs of introducing ID cards? They did that on Second Reading and in other forums.

Richard Allan: The hon. Gentleman knows that we are in a propaganda war. We are chucking figures around and the reality is that none of them are clear. If we are to be accused of talking about the excessive cost of the ID cards, I would throw back at him the view that the Government are excessively understating the potential costs.
We are much more reasonable and rational in Standing Committee than people tend to be when they are on more of the bashing-away platforms. We are trying to get at the truth. We need transparency and clarity about the true costs of this system. I am pleading for that today. If we are given those costs, we will use them. 
To date, we think that we have been given duff figures by the Government. If they want to accuse us of using duff figures, can we please have the true ones? We have been given figures that the Government have described as indicative. We have not been given the gateway review stage zero information that we need. I understand that we will not be given the other gateway review stage reports that might contain some of the clarity to which I referred. Until we get that clarity, it is hard for anyone to talk seriously about the true costs of the card. 
There is an issue of principle. When the Government put their figures forward for accounting purposes and the review of the ID card system comes before people such as me and the right hon. Member for Skipton and Ripon (Mr. Curry) on the Public Accounts Committee, should not the costs be clearly spelled out separately? I hope the Minister will be able to accept that principle today. 
The amendment would ensure that the ID card proposal is genuinely voluntary and would knock a hole out of the Government strategy of compulsion through designated documents. The debate has been helpful in establishing that compulsion is happening  today, but my concern still remains that the public debate is somehow divorced and is still behind the legislative debate. There is no clear understanding that issuing passports is the route to compulsion, as the Minister has said, and I seek to reverse that through amendment No. 164.

Des Browne: The amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam is designed completely to undermine the basis of the scheme. We had an exchange during the last sitting about whether the amendment that he spoke to then could be described as a wrecking amendment. However, although this is a wrecking amendment, it is helpful because it enables me to be as clear about the Government's position as I was in the earlier debate.
My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary made the position clear in his introductory speech on Second Reading. I accept that the discussions on ID cards that have brought us to where we are have gone through a change. There has been a process of development and there was discussion at one stage about voluntarism. It must have been clear to everybody when the draft Bill and consultation document were published that there was a basis of compulsion associated with the scheme. Although I cannot speak for everybody else who has spoken on this issue, I have never made any bones about the fact that I consider this a compulsory ID card scheme. Indeed, I have challenged people who have suggested, as the hon. Gentleman did, that there was some implied voluntarism or stealth behind the measure. 
Anybody who understands the scheme understands that there is an element of compulsion. It is the element of compulsion that the hon. Gentleman seeks to undermine and remove by making registration and the issue of the card an optional extra for persons applying for a designated document—for example, a passport or a residence permit. 
The Government have been entirely open about the fact that linking ID cards to the issue of designated documents is an important part of the scheme and it will enable a sensible, phased introduction of ID cards as British nationals renew or apply for their passports and foreign nationals apply for or renew residence permits after those documents have been designated. We have also been open about the administrative arrangements. We have announced that we will establish a new agency to issue ID cards that will build on the existing UK Passport Service and work in close conjunction with the immigration and nationality directorate of the Home Office. There will not be two completely separate processes for people applying for a designated document and an ID card. It will be a single, seamless process. 
Of course, if the scheme were optional, I believe that most applicants for these documents would choose to enrol on the register and obtain an ID card because of the additional benefits that that would bring. However, we cannot provide the choice that the hon. Gentleman proposes, because if we were to provide two types of document—one whereby the holder has had their identity checked to the highest  standard needed for entry on the register and another for those who have not—that would be an open invitation to anybody who wanted to defraud the scheme. 
It is argued that compulsion is being introduced by the back door or by stealth, but I have made it clear that it is not. Nobody is forced to obtain a British passport or to travel abroad. No foreign national is forced to come here—as a student, for example—and obtain a residence permit. If people feel strongly and decide not to apply for their passport to be renewed when it expires, it will be a matter for them. Until the second phase of the scheme is introduced, there will be no obligation on people to register. 
We have always been clear about the fact that the identity card scheme is intended eventually to become compulsory for everybody over the age of 16 and for everyone who is resident in the UK for more than three months. We expect that most people will obtain an ID card and enrol on the register during the first phase when registration will be linked to applications for and renewal of documents, such as passports or residence permits that have been designated under clause 4. 
The second phase will then become a requirement under clause 6 for those specified and who are not already registered so to do within a set period. Only then will people become liable to a civil penalty if they fail to register and obtain an ID card. 
The stage at which it will be possible to require everyone to register requires further parliamentary approval by way of a report detailing the proposal to be approved by both Houses, following by an affirmative procedure order under clause 7, which we shall debate later. I hope I have reassured the Committee that a definite link between the application for a designated document and an entry on the register is essential. I ask the hon. Gentleman not to press the amendment. 
As for costs, the hon. Gentleman is right that the Government have published only a revised figure, which is £85 for a combined passport and ID card that lasts for 10 years. Clause 37(3)(d) allows the fee to include the cost of issuing designated documents. A combined fee for a passport and an ID card can be issued and charged for as a single package and the new agency that will be based on the UK Passport Service will issue the documents. 
As the costs of checking identity will be same for both purposes, it might not be possible to accede to the hon. Gentleman's request. However, it will be the Government's intention as the process is being developed to publish information on costs. We have put certain information in the public domain. I am not in a position to add to it today, nor would it make the debate clearer if we were to guess what information might be available as the scheme develops. It will become available on the basis of the enabling legislation.

Richard Allan: The Minister has responded frankly and we have a clear difference of view. I will not waste valuable debating time by pressing all the amendments  to a Division, but in this case it is appropriate for hon. Members to give their opinion of the proposal.
Question put:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 3, Noes 10.

Question accordingly negatived.

Richard Allan: I beg to move amendment No. 79, in clause 5, page 5, line 12, leave out paragraph (b).

Derek Conway: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 80, in clause 5, page 5, line 12, leave out
', and other biometric information about himself'. 
No. 152, in clause 9, page 8, line 28, after 'allow', insert 'all of'. 
No. 97, in clause 12, page 11, line 2, leave out paragraph (b). 
No. 98, in clause 12, page 11, line 2, leave out 
', and other biometric information about himself,'. 
No. 106, in clause 14, page 13, line 20, leave out paragraph (a). 
No. 107, in clause 14, page 13, line 21, leave out paragraph (b).

Richard Allan: The amendments are designed to explore an important part of the Government's proposals, which is the use of biometric data. They cross over a group of clauses in which reference is made to biometric data. I want to explore the implications of using biometric data and the use of three biometrics in particular, which is the direction in which the Government are heading. I want to tease out from them the meaning of the phrase ''other biometric information'' and to ensure that we have on the record as much clarity as possible on the specific biometrics that the Government intend to use.
We had a brief debate on biometrics in response to an amendment spoken to by to the hon. Member for Glasgow, Anniesland (John Robertson), who discussed the concerns of organisations such as the Royal National Institute of the Blind about eye-related biometrics. However, we also need to refer to an important body of work that the Government themselves commissioned. I will try not to get too technical here, but a certain technical understanding is needed if we are to make sensible decisions on the use of biometrics. 
I refer to the document that the Government commissioned from Tony Mansfield of the National Physical Laboratory and Marek Rejman-Greene of BTexact Technologies, ''Feasibility study on the use of  biometrics in an entitlement scheme'', which is available on the ID cards website. It contains a number of points that need responding to here, as we are deciding whether the Government should be given permission to proceed with the scheme. 
In the context of the clause, the most significant issue to draw from the study is the fact that the costs of enrolment are potentially a major factor. They could end up being far greater than has been anticipated. This is clear in the early stages of the report—for example, in paragraph 5.e of the executive summary: 
''The use of biometrics will add to the cost of an entitlement card system.''
That is obvious. It continues: 
''The most significant component of this cost is the time and effort to enrol individuals and collect biometric data. However, this is one of the least well-understood aspects of biometric technologies.''
In other words, we are proceeding with something that, as the Minister said, has never been tried on this scale. 
We are talking about the mass enrolment of people using complex biometric measures that take a significant time to record correctly. All we have to go on by way of experience are some very small-scale pilots, which the Government ran and which were not always entirely smooth, and such things as fingerprinting and recording biometrics in the criminal justice context, where the system required and the volumes are on nothing like the scale we anticipate here. 
Certain features again emerge, such as the fact that the number of people with disabilities will be significant in computing the cost and effort involved. A range of disabilities might render people unsuitable for particular forms of biometric measure, which will have to be further explored. There are also questions as to the number of posts that the Government might have recording. We will come to the nature of those posts and how the Government should fulfil their responsibility to ensure that people can have their data recorded when it is demanded or it is their duty that they do so. 
The number of those posts will be critical. I understand that the current proposal is for the UK Passport Service to have about 70 places where biometric data can be recorded. The cost of biometric data recording equipment is clearly significant, but the convenience for the citizen will depend on the spread, range and nature of the places where they can have their biometric data recorded. 
There is a step change—from somebody filling in a form at the post office and sending it off to turning up somewhere—in the hassle factor. I assume that people will have to turn up during office hours, unless the Government plan to offer an out-of-hours service, which would be much more convenient. They are going to have to sit through the recording of their biometrics and potentially difficult intrusion and discomfort could be involved. If there are any problems with that biometric recording, this could be a lengthy process. These are all factors that may be important in terms of citizen acceptance, so the  organisation is significantly challenging for the Government. 
We also keep coming back to the costings. Some paragraphs in this report stand out in highlighting potential problems. Paragraph 105 gives some cost estimates: 
''We estimate that including a biometric component in a national identity database will increase costs by approximately £500 million (over the originally specified 10 year rollout period). By far the largest component of this cost will be the resources expended in collection of the images for biometric enrolment.''
The report then breaks down all the different costs involved—this is quite a bonanza for some hardware and software manufacturers. 
The figures are based on an estimate of there being 2,000 offices, which is considered a reasonable number to deliver the service needed. That is for one biometric component. The amendments relate to clauses that allow the Government to specify a number of biometric components, some of which are as yet unspecified. The phrase ''other biometric information'', which we want to remove, could permit anything to come in. 
So, we are considering a scheme that the Government themselves say may use three biometric components. If it does, I think that we can expect significant cost escalations beyond the figures set out in the Government's feasibility study. The Government are suggesting that biometric data collection will be £500 million over 10 years; that is £50 million per annum. That is within the Government's window of £85 million a year—the specified cost of the new system—but if we multiply the costs for each additional biometric, and if one biometric costs £50 million and three cost £150 million, we are straight away out of the cost envelope. If the Government are saying that they can fit three biometrics within their budget, they will have to justify that, and say why they think that the incremental costs above the original £50 million will be sufficiently low to fit their projected costings. 
Paragraph 109 of the report, which is about the selection of technology, tells us: 
''The fourth option of using all three biometric systems—fingerprint, iris and face—has been rejected both on the grounds of cost and inconvenience to citizens as well as on the likely perception by critics of this as being a 'solution too far'.''
I assume that that was the state of play, but that things have moved on. Again, it would be helpful if the Minister clarified exactly which biometrics would be used at what stage, and said exactly how he envisages the ultimate system will look. 
The final subject that we need to explore is false match data. Some horrible numbers are being bandied around. I am trying to understand exactly how false match data works, because there are false positives and false negatives. Someone could fail to be recognised as themselves; also, someone could be recognised as being someone else. Both carry different problems and have different probabilities. The probabilities vary greatly. For example, the chance  of a false match with facial recognition is significantly higher than for fingerprinting or iris recognition.

Chris Mole: The hon. Gentleman referred to the number of biometrics. Does he accept that the probability of mismatches decreases exponentially as the number of biometrics used goes up?

Richard Allan: The increased number of biometrics allows double checking to take place, but that opens up other questions, too. I think that everyone accepts that a biometric system based purely on facial recognition would be not entirely useless; in fact, it would be a significant advance on where we are now. We use one of the best computing systems available to mankind; it lives in the head. Passport officers perform facial recognition to a very high degree of accuracy using their cerebral computing devices, and for many years we have accepted that that is a very good safeguard.
Similarly, if someone goes into a police control station, as I am sure most hon. Members here have done, they will see that the police have a wall of villains—pictures of the people whom they know are the villains operating in their area. The police memorise those, go out into the streets and do a pretty good job based on their human form of facial recognition technology. Biometrically recorded facial recognition added to our method of facial recognition is actually a significant advance. But if we are going for the levels of accuracy that the Government want, and if the Government want the results to be computationally accurate—that is important—they will go for iris recognition and fingerprints, too, as that will allow those things. 
Using multiple biometrics opens up questions about the algorithm used for trying to deal with competing claims of those different biometrics. It is quite possible that, when someone goes through passport control, their face will be recognised but their irises will not, or that their irises will be recognised but not their face. There has to be a system to establish whether someone is allowed to pass on the basis of having gotten through one or two of the biometric tests but not the rest. Exploring those algorithms is important. 
There are levels at which the systems can be deemed non-functional—in other words, levels at which they would be so much hassle that they would not work at all. If a passport control system based purely on facial recognition were set up, and the number of failures was very high and each failure required somebody to go off into a separate cubicle and check a person and their documentation and to go through a great bureaucratic process, that system would be unworkable. The queues at Heathrow would be unmanageable, and the system would grind to a halt. 
There are levels at which systems are effectively unworkable; they are computed by the people who study such things. The biometric feasibility study establishes that a false match rate needs to be less than one in 1,000. It states that 
''a false alarm rate of much above 1 per cent. would probably make the system unworkable.''
We need to find the right compromise between cost, hassle, accuracy and a system that is genuinely  workable. In order to avoid false alarms, one goes for more biometrics; if one goes for more biometrics, the time required to check them increases; and thus we return to the search for that delicate balance. 
We should not necessarily accept as a given the Government's proposed scheme. It is important that they flesh out precisely how they intend to use biometrics. It is a key issue, and it must remain on the table as we discuss the Bill. Biometrics are potentially very intrusive and costly. They carry particular implications for people with disabilities, and if we are going to implement them, we must ensure that that is done in the right way. 
I can envisage circumstances in which we get it wrong. We might have invested in all the costly biometrics, but because things have not been done in the right way they might not get checked. I can also imagine a situation arising—at Heathrow, for example—where there is an inflow that cannot be stopped; people will keep coming, and if the systems do not work, at some point the decision will have to be made just to let them through. The holy grail of a biometric system is to get to a situation where the necessary checks are performed but excessive checks are not, and people can be kept flowing through the system. 
 A common theme that the Committee will return to throughout its scrutiny of the Bill is whether the Government have gone for an overkill solution for something that I described as a ''nut.'' The hon. Member for Reading, West (Mr. Salter) took offence to that, and asked whether I was describing illegal working and other things as nuts. I was describing the checking of identity as the nut. In many contexts, it is quite a minor problem, and other problems are more serious. 
There are different solutions for certain services. Even if one has a national identity register, it is not necessary to use the gold-plated, belt-and-braces, all-singing, all-dancing biometric system for everything. It would be perfectly possible to implement something like a chip and PIN system for some services, which is much easier and quicker to operate. Biometrics only where necessary is an important principle if one is seeking to reduce costs. 
That was a canter around the biometrics issue. It needs to be seriously debated. The amendments knock out all the biometric bits to give us a debating peg to hang this discussion on. I hope the Minister will be able to clarify the Government's intentions and flesh out their thinking. In particular, I would like to learn of their response to the biometric feasibility study. It was a useful piece of work that informed all of us about how these complex technologies work. In general, it is written in English rather than techy speak, and it poses important questions that the Government must answer.

Derek Conway: I shall use my cerebral recognition system to call Mr. Malins.

Humfrey Malins: And what a great system it is, Mr. Conway. 
I rise to speak on amendment No. 152, tabled in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Newark. It relates to clause 9, but it has helpfully been grouped with amendments to clause 5. It would insert the words ''all of'' before ''his fingerprints''. 
I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam for his knowledge of and expertise in biometrics, which I do not share. As he rightly said, this gives us an opportunity today to probe the Government on this and related issues. I refer to the words of my right hon. Friend the shadow Home Secretary, the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (David Davis), on Second Reading before Christmas, when he referred to a number of tests or hurdles on which the Government would need to satisfy us as the Bill proceeded through Committee. He said that 
''we must be clear about the technology's capabilities. Biometrics technology is not infallible.''
I pause only to say that I imagine that there are huge numbers of people in Parliament who are simply not familiar with the world of biometrics. They will find it difficult to understand the technicalities and would welcome a careful and detailed explanation from the Minister. 
My right hon. Friend went on to another of the important tests that the Opposition are putting forward. He said: 
''The question is whether the Government have in place the organisation necessary to introduce the scheme. We know that what they are proposing is one of the most ambitious technology projects that the country has ever seen. We also know that the Government have an abysmal record—I am not making a political point here, because most Governments have an abysmal record—in overseeing large-scale projects.''—[Official Report, 20 December 2004; Vol. 428, c. 1961–63.]
So there we have it. The Minister's task in this debate, as elsewhere, is to persuade those on the Opposition Benches of the twin issues of the effectiveness of the technology and of the capability of the scheme operators and the Government Departments involved. That will mean telling us a lot more than we know already about the details and certainty of the technology, about the companies, industries and experts who will forward the work and, incidentally, about the record of effectiveness and efficiency of some of those companies—subject to commercial confidentiality. 
I was prompted to table this amendment by an article by Philip Johnston of The Daily Telegraph, shortly before Christmas, I think, who pointed out: 
''The biometric technology is not foolproof and runs a high risk of false positive and false negative identifications. A feasibility study of the National Physical Laboratory says that in order to avoid false matches in a population of 50 million, a fingerprint system should use at least four fingers per person, preferably eight. An iris system should use both eyes and facial recognition could not on its own provide a sufficient accuracy of identification.''
During the past days and weeks a number of us on this Committee have been briefed by outside and interested organisations. Almost invariably, they have referred to the importance of biometrics—will they be effective, safe and secure? Can they be foolproof? The Law Society is one body raising doubts about whether biometrics will work accurately. There are others. The Minister may well have seen their papers, which  suggest that there is a level of unreliability in the most sophisticated current biometric checking procedures. 
I hope that the Minister has a chance to refer to the Cabinet Office document to which I was referred. I am told that the Cabinet Office found that 10 to 15 per cent. of genuine people failed biometric tests set at the highest level of corroboration, which is really quite high. That percentage, which comes from page 61 of the Cabinet Office document from July 2002 entitled ''Identity fraud: a study'', is really quite high. Accuracy rates will become crucial when magnified by the intention to include the entire population on the register. 
The Government, perhaps properly, claim that some biometric methods are extremely secure and reliable forms of identification. They are plainly keen on fingerprints and iris scans to establish one's identity, or at least one's uniqueness. Will the Minister be able to say whether biometrics are really secure? 
It is said—I refer in part to the report by Privacy International—that all biometrics have been successfully spoofed or attacked by researchers. A great deal of work has been undertaken to establish the technique of forging or counterfeiting fingerprints, and researchers in Germany have established that iris recognition is vulnerable to simple forgery. I have read that proposition in several places, and I hope that the Minister will dwell on it at length in his response. 
It is, of course, worth considering other schemes around the world to ascertain what they have done. Has a scheme similar to ours been proposed or adopted in other countries? Yes; Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand have very similar card systems. Significantly, I am told that China is moving rapidly in the same direction; it has developed a compulsory ID database and card system, but—and here is the rub—I understand that it abandoned the biometric element after concluding that the technology was unworkable with large populations. 
Does the Minister know about that? Can he comment on it? I have summarised what was said to me in a report. I do not know what the population of China is; clearly, it is much more extensive than ours, but none the less, we have a very large population here. Does he know anything about how things went wrong in China and whether we face any of the problems that it had?

Des Browne: I do not speak for the Chinese Government, nor for the decisions that they have made. However, I recognise that making decisions for 1.5 billion people—one in five of the world's population—is on an exponentially different scale, albeit that, in the United Kingdom, we face a significant challenge. I suggest that China's population size may have had some influence on the Chinese Government's decision.

Humfrey Malins: I am sure that the Minister is right. I made the point to illustrate that the Chinese Government, having researched biometrics very carefully, took the view that there comes a point at  which the population is such that the task would involve far too much. That point may have been reached in their case. We hope for reassurance from the Minister on why the task would not be too much for us, or alternatively, on why the ability to fake and spoof would not apply here, although it might in China.

Des Browne: I make a supplementary point. The hon. Gentleman may not be aware that the Chinese have a sophisticated computerised register of their population that operates through local police stations—we would call them that, but they have a different name for them. I have seen it operate. They already have a sophisticated form of registering people by households, and the Chinese Government may have felt that it was unnecessary to go beyond that at present.

Humfrey Malins: That is, indeed, possible. I was going to say that Members of Parliament are all experts on some subjects; many would consider themselves experts on most subjects. However, the truth is that we all know certain subjects better than others. I speak for myself—and, I think, for others in the House—when I say that I am not utterly familiar with biometrics and their security and effectiveness. I repeat what I said earlier: I hope that the Minister can take us through some of the issues at a gentle and persuasive pace.
We should congratulate the Home Affairs Committee on its work relating to the draft Bill and to this matter, about which it had something interesting to say. Professor Anderson of Cambridge university appeared before it to discuss iris recognition, which has been presented as a highly reliable form of biometric identifier. He was asked: 
''What evidence do you have that it is practically feasible to produce contact lenses to fake irises on a significant scale?''
The answer was illuminating. Professor Anderson said: 
''Well, I have not done it myself but I have seen a photograph of one that was produced by one of the researchers in the field and, given the underlying mathematics, I do not think there is any difficulty in principle with producing a contact lens that will produce a certain iris code.''
I hope that members of the Committee follow that; I am not entirely sure that I do. 
Professor Anderson went on to say: 
''The manufacturers of iris scanning equipment will say in their defence that it is possible to measure the nictation, the oscillation in the diameter of the pupil. I understand that none of the equipment currently on sale does that and I would be worried that someone might produce a well printed contact lens with a sufficiently clear area in the middle where the movement of the underlying eye would be taken by the scanner as indicating that the genuine eye were present. There is room for further technological work here. As things stand I am afraid that iris scanners, like fingerprint scanners, are liable to be defeated by sophisticated attack if they are used in an unattended operation. Attended operation is different, of course, if you train the staff properly they can feel people's fingerprints, they can look carefully at the eye and check there is no funny business.''
The two words that stood out to me were ''sophisticated attack''. Dealing with real world, the truth is that the issue of faking, spoofing or forging some form of biometric identifier would not occur to  99.9 per cent. of the population. Even if it did, it could not probably be tackled satisfactorily by them. 
That brings us back to the purpose of the register and the ID card scheme. The principal purpose, which we have always sought to ask the Government to confirm, is a reaction to terrorist attacks in New York and elsewhere. The scheme also aims to be a useful tool in the prevention of terrorism and terrorist attacks. I sincerely hope that that is the case. The professor's words that certain matters are liable to be defeated by a sophisticated attack mean that the 0.1 per cent.—I cannot give an accurate figure—of those within our shores who would wish us ill would be capable of such an attack.

Richard Allan: Iris recognition has been implemented only in very limited circumstances. I think that the largest scale trial involved 60,000 returning refugees to Afghanistan. It is the most accurate form of technology in preventing false matches. Only one person in 1 million will be matched to the wrong person. However, it still has a very high rate—one in 100—of false non-matches, where a person turns up, gets the scan done, and it simply does not pick up that person's record. If one person in 100 is not correctly identified as being who they are, that is clearly a big security problem.

Humfrey Malins: As always, the hon. Gentleman adds to the quality of our debates by such a useful intervention.
Does the Minister know that the Association for Payment Clearing Services, which has taken the lead in credit and debit card security, is reported to have doubts about the quality of biometric identification? I am grateful to the Library for confirming that information. Such a system was under consideration for the new generation of chip-and-pin credit and debit cards, but it was rejected because no system was found to be reliable enough. 
I bring the discussion back to my own thinking. I am a layman in such matters. The Minister may or not be a layman, but I am faced with—as are all laymen who read the information—the proposition that an expert body such as the APCS has not found a system of biometrics that was reliable enough. If the association gave such evidence in a tribunal or court, we would first acknowledge that it was an expert in such matters and, secondly, that its evidence was be persuasive. The Government have much explaining to do in respect of biometrics. As my right hon. Friend the shadow Home Secretary made plain on Second Reading, they will have to satisfy the official Opposition on several tests, of which the biometrics is one. 
I recall the conclusion of the Home Affairs Committee—not the evidence that it heard or gave. It said: 
''The security and reliability of biometrics are at the heart of the Government's case for their proposals.''
We accept that. Clearly, security and reliability must be at the heart of the proposals because it can be  nowhere else. To put it another way, if we had insecurity and unreliability, we have no case to answer. 
The Committee went on: 
''We note that no comparable system of this size has been introduced anywhere in the world.''
I did not know that until I read the report. The Minister now has the opportunity to talk to us about it. If we cannot explore such matters in Committee, we certainly cannot on Report or Third Reading, as a result of which the House of Commons will not have an opportunity to go into detail. It is essential that we do. Given that the Home Affairs Committee says that there is no comparable system in the world, I assume that the Government can confirm that. If there are similar systems, however, that involve many of the proposed elements of the system that we are discussing, the Minister is duty bound to take us through them and let us know their track record of satisfaction. I look forward to hearing from him. 
The Home Affairs Committee continued: 
''The system proposed would therefore be breaking new ground. It is essential that, before the system is given final approval, there should be exhaustive testing of the reliability and security of the biometrics chosen, and that the results of those tests should be made available to expert independent scrutiny, perhaps led by the Government's Chief Scientific Adviser.''
It took evidence over a long time and reported to the House and to the Government not many months ago. 
If we consider that recommendation, we would naturally be slightly concerned. When the Committee says that, before the system was given final approval, there should be exhaustive testing of the biometrics chosen, two points immediately spring to mind. What will be the final approval date for the system? In parliamentary terms, if such matters are discussed on Report and Third Reading, we will be asked as a Parliament to give final approval in a matter of weeks from now. 
The Committee said that the reliability and security of the chosen biometrics should be tested exhaustively before the system is approved, which suggests that the exhaustive testing that it felt was vital had not taken place; otherwise it would not have made the point. 
Again, this is an opportunity for the Minister to outline lengthily, as he should, the testing programmes and processes that have been gone through in the past few months since the Home Affairs Committee reported. Perhaps he will make the results of those tests available to the Committee. We sit next week and it would be helpful if, before that sitting, we had on our desks an exhaustive list of the test processes that have been undertaken by the Government, which were recommended strongly by the Home Affairs Committee. Indeed, the Government said, in their response to that recommendation: 
''We are engaged in a series of trials and tests to establish our technical requirements in the field of biometrics. However, the reliability, security and accuracy of the biometrics and of the enrolment and verification processes rely as much on organisational, procedural and environmental issues as technical ones.''
That made me pause to think, so I read it again, but was not sure what it meant. Will the Government give  us details of the series of trials and tests that they said that they were engaged in when they responded to the HAC? Those must have been done and we must, and would like to, hear the results so that we can be confirmed in our understanding. 
One of the bodies that reported to me was Justice, and I am sure that every Committee member has its report entitled ''Information Resource on Identity Cards'', produced in December 2004. I do not propose to go into that marvellous document today, because we do not have time, but it was produced with the assistance of volunteers from Clifford Chance, the well-known and very expensive solicitors. Justice dealt with a number of issues in relation to biometrics, and the biometrics debate could sensibly last for a lengthy period. 
One of the disadvantages of the Standing Committee process is that we are examining the Bill and—in my case, because I am not expert enough—possibly having to take what the Government say on trust. I am sure that other Committee members are in a similar position. However, in a sense, the more helpful approach, which we cannot adopt, is to act almost as a Select Committee and get people to tell us a little bit more about the matter. 
I shall quote only two or three lines from the Justice report, but I ask the Minister to confirm that the Government have taken it on board and to tell us their response to the entire report. Paragraph 22, ''IC Biometrics: fingerprints'', says: 
''Opinion as to the reliability of current technology is divided.''
I assume that that is expert opinion. Over a series of pages the report goes on to point out some of those divisions between experts. It is difficult to come down on one side or another when a technical argument like this is placed before me for consideration. 
In a later paragraph, having set out many examples, the report says: 
''Thus, it is clear that current fingerprint technology is not only susceptible to attack but there are also numerous accuracy and long term implementation issues that need to be thoroughly investigated before a large scale fingerprint identification system could be successfully introduced.''
That is a conclusion reached in the report. Who am I to say if that is right or wrong? However, as I said at the beginning, it is important, if we are to do our job properly, that we should be fully briefed on the issues.

Gwyn Prosser: I am listening to the hon. Gentleman's arguments with interest. On the use of fingerprints, compulsory biometric identity cards were introduced for asylum seekers in a brief time and were successful. In all the inquiries I have made of immigration officers in Dover—of which we have quite a number—there has not been a single reported incident of forgery or failure.

Humfrey Malins: The hon. Gentleman makes a good point. He and I served together on the Home Affairs Committee, and I am well aware of his interest and expertise in matters of asylum. He is right that the new card for asylum seekers is probably effective, and that is good. However, he will understand my earlier comment about susceptibility to sophisticated attack. If asylum seekers are genuine, they are inevitably  fleeing persecution and are not necessarily equipped either in their minds or financially to move themselves into the area of serious forgery. That is why I said that it might be a minuscule percentage of those persons within our jurisdiction that are capable of moving into that sphere. Those are the people we should most worry about. They may be the ones we should seek to target if the purpose of the Bill is to counter terrorism and terrorist acts.

Gwyn Prosser: The hon. Gentleman uses the phrase ''susceptibility to sophisticated attack''. Those were the words of Professor Anderson to our Select Committee, but he also said that that possible flaw would be apparent only if those tests were done in an unattended manner. If we talk about the sharp end of the argument—the sophisticated attack by would-be international terrorists—those checks would have the best scrutiny. They would be attended, and attendants would be trained to look for those difficulties.

Humfrey Malins: The hon. Gentleman might be convinced that biometrics is not a difficult issue. However, he must accept that there is a division of opinion even among the experts. That troubles me, as I am not personally capable of coming down on one or other side of the argument with my own background, which is not in that form of technology.

Richard Allan: There are a couple of points on the comparison with the asylum seeker system. One is the difference in scale. Interestingly, some problems of false matching increase the bigger the database. There is also the question of motivation. One would have to be pretty weird to want to pass oneself off as an asylum seeker. The motivation to want to crack that system is much less than to crack the national ID card system, where the benefits of gaining a card falsely could be significantly greater.

Humfrey Malins: I take the hon. Gentleman's point. I will move away from pure and simple biometrics for a moment—

Des Browne: Before the hon. Gentleman moves away from the matter, we could have an endless debate about biometrics, but I do not think that any of us intend to have one. The key answer to most criticism of biometrics is that, as my hon. Friend the Member for Dover pointed out, enrolment in the scheme will be supervised. It will not be possible for people to do many of the things that can spoof or beat systems. The putting of the biometrics into the register will be supervised by trained individuals. That is very important.
I do not say that there are no other concerns. However, I do not want to encourage a debate that assumes that the supervision will not take place, that lots of other things could therefore happen, and that we should start to deal with the relevant possibilities and consequences. Having taken advice, we have decided to supervise at a very high level the registration of the biometrics, and that will deal with a whole series of the arguments about spoofing. I shall not go on to the issue of whether people might want asylum registration cards. I have an answer to that, but it is not relevant.

Humfrey Malins: I am grateful to the Minister for his reassurance. Given what I have said about my own technical knowledge, he will readily understand that Committee members have been approached by reliable, respected outside organisations that have some queries. This is not a straightforward issue, about which the Minister can say, ''Don't worry, there are no problems.'' It cannot be as simple as that. Part of the purpose of today's debate is to tease from the Government their solution to some of the problems—all of them, I hope—that have been put to them by experts.
The fundamental first test is that we must be clear about the technology's capabilities. Will it work? The next issue is whether the Government are up to the challenge. We are embarking on the most immense organisational and technical programme. As I shall illustrate in a moment, our track record with some such projects has not been perfect.

Martin Salter: Before the hon. Gentleman moves on to the legitimate question of whether any Government are capable of delivering a major information technology project as efficiently and effectively as we would like, may I throw the question back at him? He needs to deal with it. The thrust of his argument on biometrics seemed to be that because the technology might not have advanced to the absolute limit of its capability, the Government should not embrace it. However, there has to come a point in the development of any technology at which the Government say, ''This has a useful application.'' If his party were in government, how much longer would it wait before embracing the advantages of technological change and innovation?

Humfrey Malins: That is a more general point, but the hon. Gentleman asks a very fair question. Owing to my lack of technical expertise, I cannot say how much longer that would be.

Martin Salter: I am a Luddite too.

Humfrey Malins: I do not know the answer to the hon. Gentleman's question. If he is asking whether I am saying that, because the technology has not reached perfection, it is not time to grasp the issue and get on with it, he asks a sensible, real question, and I give him the answer that he wants to hear: I could never wait until I was 100 per cent. sure about something before I adopted it. There would have to be a point at which I said, ''Yes, subject to any blips, I accept it.'' However, the hon. Gentleman must also understand that the issue under discussion is linked to a much later debate on cost.
At the same time, a question is perpetually on my mind. If the system cost a certain amount, I would have another balancing exercise to do in my mind: would that money be better spent in another way to achieve the objectives? That debate is for a little later on. However, the hon. Gentleman made a good intervention.

Martin Salter: The hon. Gentleman is most generous in giving way. Does he not accept that very similar arguments must have been made when the police  started using fingerprint technology? Although that technology is not perfect, it has undoubtedly resulted in the capture and conviction of many thousands, if not millions, of people throughout the developed world. Therefore, I ask the hon. Gentleman to be very careful about making inflammatory claims on the failure of biometrics because we are all on a learning curve. Does he not agree that the fact that many other sophisticated and developed societies and Governments are embracing biometric technology teaches us, as a matter of common sense, that Britain must embrace it because of its benefits, and also be mindful of the fact that it will continue to develop and improve?

Humfrey Malins: If I may say so, that is another very fair intervention by the hon. Gentleman. I am looking forward to hearing about the experiences of other countries that are embracing the technology; there will not be another possibility for us to do so.
The hon. Gentleman raises the issue of fingerprints. In effect, he is asking me whether I think it is likely that before that technology was introduced there was a tremendous argument about whether that would be worth doing, and whether it has in fact been worth doing. I am sure that there were arguments against it at the time, and I know with my other hat on that the fingerprint match is a tremendously helpful asset in criminal cases, so I agree that they work. 
I have repeatedly said that I am not an expert in the field of biometrics and I await to be convinced on all matters, but where I probe a little more than gently is in asking what practical effect the biometric scheme as a whole will have on the mischief that we are trying to cure by the Bill. What is that mischief? I do not need to go outside and identify myself very often, and I would say to anybody who wanted to discuss that subject, ''Please don't ask me to be interested in biometrics for the purposes of identifying myself because I don't have a problem with that.'' That is not what the Bill is about. It is principally about giving us the tools to fight a possible terrorist attack. If it is about that, the issue of biometrics must be discussed in the context of how effective it will be specifically in terms of the principal purpose of the whole system, which is to fight terrorist acts. After all, the previous Home Secretary—the right hon. Member for Sheffield, Brightside (Mr. Blunkett)—and other Ministers have said that they think that the system will help in countering terrorism, although the extent to which they think it will help varies.

Martin Salter: Will the hon. Gentleman reflect on the statement he has just made? The motivation for supporting an ID cards Bill cannot be purely to engage in the fight against terrorism. Does he not accept that Committee members have different reasons for supporting or opposing the Bill. The fight against terrorism is important to me, but the ability of any Government to know exactly who is in the country, and issues to do with serious organised crime, money laundering and the smuggling of drugs and people, are all of equal importance. I would like the hon. Gentleman to reflect on the fact that Committee members have been motivated to want to serve on the  Committee and to make the Bill work by many different issues.

Humfrey Malins: I do reflect on that, but I come back to my central point that none of this legislation would have ever been introduced but for the terrorist attacks of the past few years. The Bill was prompted by them, and it is proper for us to consider that.
However, I repeat to the hon. Gentleman that there are several balancing exercises involved here. A most important balancing exercise would be to ask, having decided whether the system before us can help in the fight against terror, whether we think that the money spent on the scheme could be better spent differently to achieve the same result. We shall come on to that.

Des Browne: The hon. Gentleman is enormously generous in giving way. He has probably been on his feet longer than he expected, but this is an important debate, and if we can contextualise the issue properly, it may save us a significant amount of time, both in my response and in our debates on this and other clauses.
All parties in the House, as well as some on the Labour Benches who oppose identity cards, support the introduction of biometrics in travel documents. The hon. Member for Winchester (Mr. Oaten), who speaks for the Liberal Democrats, said that he supported expenditure on biometrics for passports, and thought it appropriate. That is what the bulk of expenditure on this scheme will go on. We will have to tackle the issue in any event. Just because we cannot answer all the questions properly now, does not mean that we have not all accepted that we need to face the challenge of developing the reliability and security of biometric technology for passports. That is a challenge that we all face, and something that we support. 
I would not like to think that the continued support of the official Opposition was dependent on us having a perfect biometric system by the time Opposition Members come to vote for the Bill on Third Reading, as I hope that they will.

Humfrey Malins: The continued support of the official Opposition will, inevitably, depend on meeting the five tests put forward by my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden on Second Reading. Before long, we will get to the issue of whether the money spent on the scheme could be better spent elsewhere. However, the Minister's intervention was helpful, and this has been a good debate so far. 
I move on briefly to the issue of technology, and the question of whether the Government can achieve what they want. All Governments are the same, in the sense that they are not necessarily bodies to whom I would trust a great deal, in terms of handling aspects of my life or anything with which I am connected. But that is the nature of Governments. The hon. Member for Reading, West suggested that I was being inflammatory; I hope not, as that is not my style. I do not want to be inflammatory now when I say that this Government have failed to implement successfully practically every large IT system that they have tried to implement. That has resulted in a loss to the public of many, many billions of pounds in the past few years. 
The former Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Sheffield, Brightside himself said that 
''it is important to recognise the past failures of Government technology systems''.—[Official Report, 3 July 2002; Vol. 388, c. 231.]
One has only to look at the Child Support Agency, the UK Passport Service, the Inland Revenue, National Air Traffic Services and the Criminal Records Bureau to see that the list goes on and on. Whatever Government are in place, it is never surprising to anyone on either side of the House when they read something that says: ''System Crashes, Chaos Results''. We think, ''My Goodness, another shambles!'' That is an entirely non-party political point. Every expensive project, in my experience, promises to deliver better and cheaper services to the public but inevitably fails to do so. 
I ask the Minister to be as open with us as he can be on the issue of the companies and bodies that will be involved in the project. [Interruption.] I see hon. Members holding their papers. It is either because they have absolutely had enough of me or because time is moving on. 
Someone somewhere has to administer the scheme. There may be considerations of commercial sensitivity that we need to discuss more privately, but I have read in an official report made to me that a company called— 
It being twenty-five minutes past Eleven o'clock, The Chairman adjourned the Committee without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order. 
Adjourned till this day at half-past Two o'clock.